Abstract-During forensic database investigations, audit records become a crucial evidential element; particularly, when certain events can be attributed to insider activity. However, traditional reactive forensic methods may not be suitable, urging the adoption of proactive approaches that can be used to ensure accountability through audit records whilst satisfying Chain of Custody (CoC) requirements for forensic purposes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Database Forensics allows investigating malicious activities performed by trusted employees or insiders who, motivated by financial gain, could misuse their privileged access [1] in order to disclose or contaminate [2] transactional databases. Since audit records may be considered legal evidence [3] , accountability and forensics become crucial investigation elements for analysing and justifying insider behaviour [4] .
However, there is a difficulty in considering audit records as legally relevant or admissible if the lack of accountability and forensic features, within the database environment, enables malicious insiders to cover up their activities, and eventually make them appear as authorised [5] . For instance, unauthorised payments were made by malicious employees of a public institution in Ecuador 1 , who used privileged system credentials for making them look legitimate. Although evidence could have been retrieved from the database, its audit records were inconsistent as it was reported to be inadequate and vulnerable.
On the other hand, ensuring admissibility also requires forensic practitioners to establish an unbroken accountability trail in order to show 'due dilligence' when handling any 1 form of data and records. This requirement is known as Chain of Custody (CoC), which basically describes the 'evidence continuum', delivering proof of adequate handling, and justification of actions performed on any evidential item. Nonetheless, when investigating databases, initiating and maintaining CoC is difficult because, unlike proactive forensics, the generally accepted reactive approach [6] may not be able to properly analyse and justify insider actions.
First of all, reactive database forensics is comprised of bottom-up methods that adapt traditional digital forensics techniques for recovering scattered pieces of evidence in order to reconstruct the database state [7] . Examples of these methods are table-relationship analysis [8] and data file carving [9] . However, these methods either lack formalisation and scientific background [10] , or may not be suitable for investigating databases [11] . As a consequence, ad hoc database investigations over rely on the practitioner's knowledge and expertise, leading to conjectures about insider behaviour since the only available evidence to fully explain such actions may be partially recovered or unavailable.
Alternatively, the proactive approach is an emerging topdown method which is based on the premise that databases per se were designed with forensically ready features, such as triggers [12] , for auditing insider activities [10] . Hence, audit records can be generated, collected and preserved in order to draw conclusions based on more generalistic behavioural traces than those which may (or may not) be present within reactively recovered evidence. This research takes on this approach, introducing a proactive architecture for database forensics so that the generation, collection and preservation of audit records can be done under CoC restrictions.
In section II, role segregation, evidence provenance, event timeliness and causality are considered as Chain of Custody (CoC) requirements for the proactive investigation of databases. In section III, the previous requirements are implemented as functional features of a distributed architecture for the generation, collection and preservation of audit records that can be used to explain insider activity. A vector clock mechanism is implemented in a stored procedure for recording causality and timeliness every time Data Manipulation Language (DML) events are triggered. In section IV, experimental results are presented, regarding the construction of DML event timeliness, the relationship between causality and provenance, and the architectural performance. Finally, related and future work along with conclusions are given in sections V and VI, respectively.
II. CHAIN OF CUSTODY REQUIREMENTS IN PROACTIVE
DATABASE FORENSICS Traditionally, digital forensics has been known as a scientific approach for the identification, collection, validation, preservation, and subsequent analysis of digital evidence [13] . This life cycle has a slight variation during proactive investigations, where evidence must be generated, collected and preserved before the analysis phase [14] . However, regardless the approach, Chain of Custody (CoC) must be initiated and maintained according to the generally accepted 4 principles of digital evidence 2 [15] :
• [16] with their corresponding actor (insider causing the event). However, in order to guarantee the applicability of these principles as established in Principle 4, Chain of Custody (CoC) must be initiated and maintained, considering that the generation, collection and preservation of audit records must be performed whilst transactional database operations are also being executed. This brings on the consideration of role segregation, evidence provenance, event timeliness and causality as CoC requirements so that reproducibility and verification of insider activity can be ensured within a forensically ready environment.
A. Separation of Concerns
As established by Principle 1, a clear functional separation of concerns [17] is required in order to prevent potential changes in audit records whilst avoiding overlapping functional responsibilities. Although the administrator role (DBA) is normally in charge of managing audit functions [18] , a explicit forensic role and a corresponding forensic database should be created for preventing discretionary violations of administrative functions, such as disabling audit mechanisms on convenience [19] . 2 Where necessary, bracketed text denote paraphrasing for adapting the concept of the principles to the article's context. 
The function segregation prevents a database user having administrator and forensic permissions at the same time.
By placing transactional event accountability, and controlling access to audit functionally [3] , Def. II.1 follows Principle 2, allowing monitoring insider actions in order to justify that audit records were produced without negligent insider intervention.
B. Evidence Provenance
Principle 3 states that audit records should reflect a trail of events in order to ensure third-party verification; specially, after an insider security violation [3] . Thus, provenance becomes a CoC requirement during the generation of audit records, allowing investigators to relate DML events with their actors.
Definition II.2. Provenance
Let provenance be a 6-attribute tuple representing the description level of audit records:
In Table I , the required granularity provenance description level [20] on audit records is described in order to explain DML events: 
From (1) and (2), timestamps v i can be expressed in terms of audit records e j i in order to explicitly identify the audit table t i which they belong to:
The index i is sufficient to represent the n-tuple of the vector clock V n since an audit 
Where: 
Hence, the timestamp values of each component of the vector clock can be registered on the timeline T l and retrieved when required.
D. Event Causality
Form the forensic point of view, applying Principle 3 not only enables the construction of a timeline (section II-C), but also allows sequencing DML events in order to identify and explain their interactions [22] . Likewise, for accountability purposes, timeliness allows the generation and collection of audit records with time restrictions, so they can be stored and reviewed in later investigation stages [3] . As shown in Def. II.7, the global history of audit records in a timeline initiates and maintains CoC requirements by introducing an element of causality [23] for explaining the sequential relationship or their corresponding DML events. Since audit records in databases are strictly bound to timestamps, sequencing them requires establishing a 'happenbefore' relation (represented by →) with a strong timestamp condition [21] 
∀e, e ∈ E • (e||e ⇒ ¬(e → e ∧ e → e))
From the transitive property in Def. II.9 and its implication in concurrent events (Def. II.10), one can infer that an ideal external observer must be "informed" of the existence of an intermediate event e b [21] as concurrent events are not bound to timestamp restrictions. However, determining whether or not such an event actually 'happened before' a receiving event e c is a concurrency challenge for building the timeline T l . This requires the introduction of an asynchronous method for preventing inconsistent observations, and therefore make an intermediate event 'wait' if an ongoing event has not been registered yet (Fig. 1c) . The solution to this problem is explained later in section III-C3. In a proactive forensics approach audit records must be generated, collected and preserved within a forensically ready environment. However, for making them admissible, the Chain of Custody (CoC) requirements explained in section II must be considered as functional specifications. In Fig. 3 , an experimental architecture is outlined in order to proactively generate and collect audit records, and at the same time, preserve a timeline of their occurrence (sections II-C and II-D).
III. IMPLEMENTING A DISTRIBUTED ENVIRONMENT FOR PROACTIVE DATABASE FORENSICS
In the following sections, these architectural components are explained in detail.
A. Separation of Concerns
For achieving role segregation (section II-A), separation of concerns is implemented by using a transactional and a forensics database (Fig. 3-A) . Whilst the transactional database (and its corresponding roles) is in charge of transactional operation and administration, the forensics database with a explicit forensic role deploys the forensic routines for the generation, collection and generation of DML event-related audit records (section II-C, lit. a -c). As a result, an event timeline can be created based on the causal relation of sequential events with timestamp restrictions, as explained in section II-D.
B. Concurrent DML Event Generation
For experimental purposes, in order to generate concurrent events, synthetic workload is produced by means of a Master Event Generation Server (MeGen) and two Event Generation Clients (CeGen) (Fig. 3-B) . MeGen is a master terminal coordinating concurrent activity using threaded database connections to emulate transactional behaviour in a distributed environment. Meanwhile, CeGen is comprised of two slave terminals which are in charge of passing concurrent DML requests from MeGen to the transactional database.
C. Proactive Database Forensics Routines
Triggers and stored procedures are implemented as external forensic routines (Fig. 4) with explicit enable/disable permissions assigned to a specific forensic database role (section II-A). This prevents them to be easily accessed, or conveniently disabled by malicious insiders with administrator privileges. Additionally, abstraction can be provided by obscuring their implementation particularities from normal database roles, achieving access control for ensuring Chain of Custody compliance during the generation, collection and preservation of audit records:
1) Evidence Generation -Fig. 4-1:
Every time DML requests are sent from CeGen to the transactional database, a corresponding evidence generation trigger in a receiving table is executed. These triggers not only generate audit records, but also automatically capture specific provenance descriptive attributes (section II-B) related to the occurrence of a DML event in the transactional database.
2) Evidence Collection -Fig. 4-2:
Data tables within the transactional database have their corresponding audit tables in the forensic database (Fig. 2) . Then, evidence generation triggers in the transactional database execute evidence collection stored procedures in the forensic database for storing audit records and their provenance descriptive attributes in the audit tables (Def. II.2).
3) Evidence Preservation -Fig. 4-3:
A causal table in the forensic database (Fig. 2) is used to build an event timeline T l (Def. II.7). Whilst audit records are generated and collected in the audit tables t i , their corresponding evidence preservation triggers execute an evidence preservation stored procedure in order to create a causal audit record, assigning timestamp values T s to build a timeline T l in the causal table. The implementation of this stored procedure, following the vector clock mechanism specification in Def. II.5, is shown in the following pseudo code (List. 1): Since the construction of a timeline T l must be accurate with no 'events lost' due concurrent user activity (Def. II.10), in List. 1, causal event registration is executed using serialised transactions. This prevents the occurrence of concurrent intermediate events (Fig. 1c) which, due to incorrect transitivity (Def. II.9), may be recorded before an ongoing sending event is received.
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The technical specifications of the forensically ready environment depicted on Fig. 3 are briefly explained as follows: a. A transactional and a forensics database (Fig. 3-A) were implemented in MSSQL Server 2014 with operative (DBUser), administrative (DBAdmin) and forensic (DBForenics) roles enabled. b. For concurrent DML event generation, both MeGen and CeGen implement JMeter 3 in master-slave mode, respectively ( Fig. 3-B) . c. Proactive DB forensic routines (Fig. 3-C) are implemented using Common Language Runtime (CLR) C# Assemblies, and deployed in their respective databases, following the deployment architecture shown in Fig. 4 . 720 concurrent DML request samples were modelled and executed in MeGen and CeGen, and captured using the forensic routines. This allowed analysing timeliness, the relationship amongst causality and provenance, and finally, measuring the architectural performance. [19] This proves that using hardware and logical clock timestamps is equivalent since the causal relationship between the 17th, 18th and 19th sequence remains. This is very useful considering that auditors and forensic practitioners usually rely on timestamps associated with hardware clock values for explaining DML event sequencing; i.e., date and time of a particular DML event. However, if these values are tampered with by a malicious insider, audit record integrity can be compromised. Also, if hardware clocks were used, they have to be synchronised which is transactionally expensive if the database is geographically distributed. (Table IV) in Table IV are acceptable for a concurrent scenario, where using rudimentary audit features may even increase latency beyond the shown thresholds. For avoiding adding throughput on the database, our featured audit and forensic components (Fig. 4) perform serialised operations in relays so that a causal record can be produced only after its corresponding audit event has been recorded, adding 3 to 5 ms. of latency, when enabling 'only audit' and 'audit & forensics' features, respectively.
B. Relation of Provenance and Causality

V. RELATED AND FUTURE WORK
An early attempt to capture a notion of timeliness was developed in [25] . Later, in [23] , research on separation of concerns in NoSQL databases was conducted whilst the usage of de-normalised tables for handling evidence was introduced in [26] . On the contrary, despite not being strictly related to databases, [27] recently introduced timeline construction based on audit trails. Our research considers these contributions in order to formalise Chain of Custody requirements, and implement a forensically ready architecture for the generation, collection and preservation of database audit records. Our findings have established a relationship between provenance and causality for databases, also inspired by the approach used in [28] . Future work is expected to be developed for capturing provenance during the occurrence of SELECT events, which cannot be done using database triggers.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
For justifying Chain of Custody (CoC) requirements in proactive database forensics, role segregation, provenance, timeliness and causality must be captured within a forensically ready architecture.
Regarding role segregation, although trigger auditing functionality can be used, conventional SQL implementations cannot prevent them to be disabled by malicious or negligent insiders. We use an explicit forensic database role to deploy CLR C# triggers and stored procedures, obscuring implementation details and restricting their access from operational and administrative database roles (Section III-C).
With regard to provenance, the implemented forensic database uses de-normalised audit tables to capture provenance descriptive attributes (Section II-B) along with audit records. This enables capturing time and type of DML events along with information about their actors.
Finally, timeliness and causality are mutually related CoC requirements because one cannot be explained without the other. Although auditors and forensic investigators may rely in hardware clock timestamps for explaining DML event sequentiality, we have proved that vector clock logic timestamps are equivalent to hardware clock timestamps. Thus, DML events become independent of hardware clock failures and manipulations because their occurrence real time becomes a descriptive provenance attribute rather than an element for explaining their causality.
